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MEANNESS AS RACIAL IDEOLOGY 
Derrick Bell* 
THE PORT CHICAGO MUTINY: THE STORY OF THE LARGEST MU-
TINY TRIAL IN U.S. NAVAL HISTORY. By Robert L. Allen. New 
York: Warner Books. 1989. Pp. xxi, 192. $19.95. 
They asked if I knew what "conscientious objector" meant. I told 
them that when the white man asked me to go off somewhere and fight 
and maybe die to preserve the way the white man treated the black man 
in America, tb,en my conscience made me object. 
-Malcolm X1 
For African Americans, the logic of Malcolm X's statement has an 
inescapable universality. Even so, most black men have been willing 
to fight in America's wars. They have heeded the call both because of 
patriotism and in the hope that their participation might lead to im-
provements in their status and that of other blacks. Throughout much 
of American history, black patriotism was deemed suspect by whites 
who admitted blacks into the military only when motivated by neces-
sity.2 Because of this reluctance, blacks in the military, in addition to 
the usual risks of war, were expected to remember their subordinate 
role in civilian life and suffer silently the racial insults and discrimina-
tory treatment consonant with their lesser status. A black group's re-
fusal to accept such dishonor with dignity was deemed a racial 
rebellion and treated as one. 
In August 1917, Negro soldiers of the Twe_nty-fourth Infantry's 
Third Battalion, seasoned regulars, began fighting with white civilians 
• Weld Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B. 1952, Duquesne University; LL.B. 
1957, University of Pittsburgh. Ed. 
1. M.X. with the assistance of A. Haley, The Autobiography of Malcolm X 205 (1964). 
2. In the Revolutionary War, despite the heroics of Crispus Attucks (the first man to die at 
the Boston Massacre) and other black men who fought at Lexington, Concord, Ticonderoga, and 
Bunker Hill, blacks were initially barred from military service. Upon taking command of the 
American troops in July 1775, George Washington issued an order that no Negroes should be 
enlisted. Subsequently, finding himself short of white enlistments and with the British promising 
freedom to slaves who joined their side, Washington changed his mind and black soldiers fought 
in several major battles. L. BENNETI, BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK 
AMERICA 55-59 (4th ed. 1969). 
In the War of 1812, as well as the naval war with France (1798-1800), "Negro soldiers and 
sailors served prominently, and often courageously," after military necessity negated policies 
issued in 1798 forbidding Negro enlistments in the Marine Corps and on naval ships. L. 
LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY 32 (1961). 
In the Civil War, efforts by blacks to serve were initially rejected, but Lincoln underwent a 
change in attitude when faced with, among other things, shortages of white men willing to fight. 
D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 3-6 (2d ed. 1980). 
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in Houston, Texas, who had been goading and insulting them. The 
black soldiers were disarmed when it was feared they might use their 
weapons to defend themselves. Refusing to be outdone, the soldiers 
seized arms and, in the riot that ensued, seventeen whites and two 
Negroes were killed. "With only a slight pretense of a trial, thirteen 
Negro soldiers were [denied appeal and] hanged for murder and mu-
tiny, forty-one were imprisoned for life, and forty others were held 
pending further investigation."3 Following the Houston riots, the gov-
ernment suspended black recruitment until late September while 
pondering whether to keep all blacks out of combat. In response to a 
hail of protests from blacks around the country, blacks were admitted 
to combat duty - in principle. In fact, though, most black soldiers 
were assigned to labor duty.4 
During World War II, more than a million black men and women 
served in the armed services. Although there was a great deal of dis-
crimination, blacks had a greater opportunity to serve in front-line 
roles than in previous wars. Even so, many blacks were simply labor-
ers in uniform. They faced blatant discrimination and quick retalia-
tion if they dared take a stand against it. It was just such resistance 
that the Navy construed as mutiny after unarmed black sailors refused 
to return to loading ammunition in the wake of a major munitions 
explosion on the West Coast. 
His interest sparked by a faded 1945 pamphlet protesting the mu-
tiny court-martial, Robert Allen, scholar, writer, and civil rights and 
anti-war activist, worried over, researched, and wrote The Port Chi-
cago Mutiny over a period of ten years. Despite setbacks and periodic 
self-doubts about the likelihood of bringing his project to a successful 
conclusion, Allen pressed on. He overcame obstacles of hard-to-ob-
tain records, lost and reluctant interviewees, and a general lack of in-
terest in an unfortunate incident that, after all, had occurred almost 
fifty years ago while America was locked into a war that threatened its 
survival. 
Allen, though, did not want this tragedy to be either forgotten or 
rationalized into oblivion. He subtitled his work, The Story of the 
Largest Mass Mutiny Trial in U.S. Naval History. The result is worth 
3. J. FRANKLIN & A. Moss, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 297 (6th ed. 1988); see also N. 
PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON 332 (1987). Bergman describes the subsequent legal 
events: 
The NAACP engaged a defense attorney for the soldiers and campaigned for clemency. 
President Wilson commuted 10 death sentences to life imprisonment. NAACP efforts led 4 
years later to the release of some and a reduction in life sentences of others. Its efforts 
continued until 1938 when President Roosevelt released the last prisoner. 
P. BERGMAN, THE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 381 (1969). 
4. N. PAINTER, supra note 3, at 332. 
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the effort because, while the events Allen investigated occurred more 
than a decade before the Supreme Court declared government-sanc-
tioned racial segregation unconstitutional, 5 the racial attitudes and 
policies that led to a largely forgotten disaster in a small California 
town provide a standard for comparing current racial events, some of 
which are less dramatic but no less damaging. At the least, the chroni-
cle provides another perspective on the intricacies of racial prejudice 
in the United States. 
In 1944, during the height of World War II, the U.S. Navy loaded 
thousands of tons of ammunition onto Liberty ships from a dock in 
Port Chicago, a small town near San Francisco. At this dock, unlike 
other, similar West Coast sites, the Navy did not use civilian steve-
dores but assigned this backbreaking and highly dangerous labor to 
black sailors laboring under the direction of white officers who were 
far more concerned about setting records for tonnage loaded than 
about safety procedures or the welfare of their men. 
The black sailors, trained to serve at sea, received no instruction in 
the handling of ammunition. Joe Small, one of the black sailors as-
signed to the loading group and later indicted as a leader of the mu-
tiny, operated a winch that lifted nets filled with bombs and artillery 
shells from the docks to the holds of the ships. Small told Robert 
Allen "that he rather casually 'picked up' the job of being a winch 
operator after watching other men operate the machines" (p. 42). 
Small was aware of the danger. "If a bomb fell out or the net came 
loose and dumped the load into the hold, it would mean disaster. 
There is absolutely no place to run or hide in the hold of a Liberty ship 
being loaded with ammunition" (p. 11). 
Weeks before the explosion, the longshoremen's union reportedly 
warned the Navy that there would be a disaster if the Navy continued 
to use untrained seamen to load ammunition. The union, for example, 
would not allow a winch operator like Joe Small to handle ammuni-
tion unless he had years of experience with other cargo. The Navy 
ignored the warning and rejected union offers to send experienced 
longshoremen to train Navy recruits in safety practices (p. 120). 
Understandably, morale among the black sailors was low. They 
were far from the war zone and yet assigned to very dangerous work 
performed under the constant pushing of white officers. There was 
little chance for promotion and virtually no recreational facilities. The 
town of Port Chicago was not friendly to blacks, and there was no 
military transportation from the base to Oakland or to San Francisco. 
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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The men expressed their opposition in varying ways. Occasionally, a 
man might go AWOL or simply refuse to work. Others, over time, 
came to discount the risks or simply accept what they could not 
change. Some, like Joe Small, challenged the officers regarding the 
risk of an explosion. The officers, denied that concussion alone would 
explode the bombs and assured the men that the bombs were harmless 
with their detonator caps removed. 
On July 17, 1944, what many feared, happened: 
[A]n explosion with a force equal to that of the bomb dropped on Hiro-
shima nearly leveled ... Port Chicago. Two military cargo ships loaded 
with ammunition and the entire Port Chicago waterfront were vaporized 
by the blast . . . . Three hundred and twenty men lost their lives. Two 
hundred and two of them were black. It was the worst home-front disas-
ter of World War II. 6 
Following the disaster, the Navy denied the surviving black sailors 
the thirty-day leave it allowed the white survivors. After only a few 
weeks, the black men were ordered back to work at another port 
nearby, where the conditions were just as unsafe as those that had 
prevailed despite the frequent complaints at Port Chicago. When 
more than 200 black sailors refused the order, they were marched to a 
barge and held under guard for several days. Eventually, fifty men 
were singled out for court-martial, charged with mutiny, and con-
victed. By year's end, they had received and were already serving 
prison sentences ranging from eight to fifteen years. 
Robert Allen obtained the basic facts of the explosion and trial 
from a faded pamphlet that asked, "Remember Port Chicago?" (p. 
xiii). He gathered more details from newspaper accounts and declassi-
fied military records. But the uniqueness of the story comes from in-
terviews with the survivors, principally Joe Small. In the wake of the 
explosion, and advised that transfers to other work, including combat, 
would not be granted, many of the men decided that they did not want 
to load ammunition anymore. As one of them put it: 
I just said: No, I ain't going back on that damn thing [shiploading]. 
Why don't they get some whiteys and put them down there. I said hell, 
I'm a gunneryman. They taught me how to fire guns; I'm supposed to be 
on a ship. Now they got me working as a stevedore. And I'm not get-
ting stevedore's pay. [p. 76] 
Several of the men approached Small for advice. They respected 
him and viewed him as their informal leader. Small made it clear that 
he would not return to loading ammunition, though he was ready to 
do other work. The work stoppage that precipitated the arrests and 
6. This vivid description is from the book's dust jacket. 
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charges was not planned. Three weeks after the explosion, when the 
men were ordered to fall in, it was not clear whether they would be 
marched to the docks or to the parade ground. At a fork in the road, 
the lieutenant in charge gave the order "Column Left" toward the 
docks. Everybody stopped dead and refused to move. 
An officer called Small out from the ranks and asked him point 
blank whether he was going back to work. Small told him, "No, sir." 
Asked why, Small said he was afraid, at which point others in the 
ranks said, "If Small don't go, we're not going, either'' (p. 81). The 
base chaplain, oblivious of the incongruity both in his words and in the 
Navy's treatment of these black sailors, added insult to injury by try-
ing to appeal to their race pride. He told the men that "they were 
letting down the loyal men of their race and their friends as well" (p. 
81). When efforts to shame the men for failing to do their duty in the 
war effort failed, they were individually ordered back to work. The 
258 men out of 328 who continued to express an unwillingness to han-
dle ammunition were confined to a barge tied to a pier. In the 
meantime, civilian contract stevedores were hurriedly hired to load the 
ships. 
Like captives in the hold of a slave ship, the men were confined in 
the crowded barge for three days. Tensions were high on the barge, 
and there were frequent arguinents and not infrequent fights. Fearing 
a riot, Small warned them to be calm and to avoid the guards. The 
officers, he felt, were just waiting for the men to "mess up. . . . [S]o 
they [could] mess us up" (p. 84). He urged the men to stick together 
and to provide the officers no excuse for calling in the Marines. The 
meeting lasted only a few minutes, but at the court-martial it became 
evidence of a mutinous conspiracy organized by Small. The men felt 
that at best, they might be transferred, at worst they might be impris-
oned or given dishonorable discharges. No one expected the mutiny 
charges. As one sailor told Allen later, "We didn't even know what 
mutiny meant" (p. 84). 
Following another demand that the men choose either to work or 
to face a court-martial for mutiny and a possible death sentence, fifty 
continued to refuse and were placed in the brig. All 258 men, both 
those who chose work and received summary court-martials and those 
who still refused, were interrogated intensively for the next three 
weeks - without benefit of counsel - in an effort to build a case 
against those, like Small, who steadfastly refused to load ammunition. 
Interestingly, a few days after the work stoppage, the Navy sought 
to defuse racial discrimination charges by introducing a personnel ro-
tation system so that black sailors would not be retained indefinitely at 
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the munitions loading docks. In addition, a contingent of white en-
listed men were sent to work at Port Chicago. Had the Navy re-
sponded to the black sailors' concerns with these actions initially, the 
black seamen would not have refused to work, and there would have 
been no reason for a mutiny court-martial. 
The fifty were formally charged with mutiny in September 1944. 
The Navy encouraged press coverage, perhaps, Allen suggests, both to 
counter claims that it would be a kangaroo court and to intimidate 
other dissident sailors. The trial lasted more than a month, but after 
only 80 minutes of deliberation, all fifty of the defendants were found 
guilty of mutiny. Thurgood Marshall, then counsel to the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, who observed 
the trial, noted that this averaged out to about a minute-and-a-half of 
deliberation for each defendant. All were sentenced to fifteen years in 
prison with reductions to twelve years for some not deemed "ringlead-
ers." Even the 208 men who agreed to work after initially joining the 
work stoppage were given summary court-martials resulting in bad-
conduct discharges and forfeiture of three months' pay. Allen informs 
us that "[w]ith perverse but unrelenting logic those who were respon-
sible for the conditions at Port Chicago were never accused of any 
wrongdoing, while those who were the chief victims of those condi-
tions were charged, tried, convicted, and jailed" (pp. 128-29). 
The NAACP, other civil rights groups, and the black media had 
taken a strong interest in the case. They pressured government offi-
cials and launched a media campaign that met with some success after 
the Japanese surrendered in August 1945 and war hysteria subsided. 
The following month, sentences were reduced to two to three years 
with credit for time already served. 
The Port Chicago men were released from prison but not from the 
Navy. They were divided into small groups and sent to the South 
Pacific for a "probationary period." Joe Small recalls this time of ex-
ile, of wandering back and forth across the Pacific without duties and 
nothing to do but make mess call. The men were finally discharged 
"under honorable conditions" but the mutiny convictions still stand. 
When Allen interviewed Small forty years later, he still remembered 
the appalling conditions under which they were working. The explo-
sion, Small recalled, offered an avenue of escape from those appalling 
conditions. 
After returning home, Small married and raised a family despite 
experiencing a good deal of discrimination in civilian life. He remains 
philosophical about the disaster, tragedy, and hardship he has encoun-
tered over the years. He carries no grudges against the Navy. As he 
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puts it, "I don't find nothing wrong with the Navy as a whole, because 
the Navy has changed tremendously since I was in there. There's been 
tremendous strides toward desegregation" (pp. 142-43). Small 
proudly told Allen that one of his sons was entering the Navy, adding 
"I wouldn't want him to go into any service except the Navy" (p. 143). 
Reading The Port Chicago Mutiny and trying to imagine the moti-
vations for the blatant and unremitting racism the Navy forced the 
black sailors in Port Chicago to endure, my thoughts returned again 
and again to a question a black student once raised in my civil rights 
course. Obviously agitated by the class' lengthy discussion of racial 
discrimination, the student raised his hand and asked dramatically, 
''Professor Bell, would you please tell me just one thing. Why are 
white folks so mean?" 
My student's question was, of course, not a question at all. Rather, 
it was a telling statement that the course was intended to answer, even 
though there are no answers that are really sufficient or satisfying. 
When defining a situation is too difficult, illustrations can help. Rob-
ert Allen's book provides us with a definitive illustration. For the Port 
Chicago tragedy is, at bottom, a portrait of racial meanness. It is a 
tragedy precisely because it was far more illustrative of the norm than 
the accidental in the history of American racial justice. 
As it pertains to blacks in wartime, the American norm has always 
been ambivalence: an illogical oscillation between valuing blacks as 
comrades-in-arms in a crisis and a deeply felt need not to permit 
blacks to escape from their subordinate place. Meanness then is that 
quality of racism that is the equivalent of "piling on" in football or 
"kicking a man when he is down" in street fighting. That is, both 
analogies acknowledge that there is a struggle and that one side, 
though prevailing, is moved to humiliate the opponent, to inflict an 
unneeded blow to remove all doubt as to "who is boss." 
The racial meanness phenomenon is certainly not limited to the 
military. Indeed, as conditions for blacks in civilian life continue to 
deteriorate, it may be that the military services are something of an 
equality haven for blacks in uniform .. But consider the meanness com-
ponent in the Supreme Court's civil rights rulings in the past few 
Terms. For example, Brenda Patterson charged that during ten years 
of employment, she was subjected to various forms of racial harass-
ment, denied wage increases, promotions, and training for higher-level 
jobs, and was finally discharged - all because she is black. She sought 
relief under a civil rights statute guaranteeing blacks the same right to 
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"make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens."7 A 
majority of the Court construed the statute to deny relief because the 
statutory language "prohibits discrimination only in the making and 
enforcement of contracts."8 Thus, the statute does not reach "conduct 
by the employer after the contract relation has been established, in-
cluding ... imposition of discriminatory working conditions."9 Thus 
construed, the statute that even in its most liberal reading10 had made 
only a small dent in the hard shell of employment discrimination, is 
reduced to a status best described as ludicrous. 
Inconsistency is also a form of racial meanness when it denies civil 
rights petitioners relief on a rationale Professor Kenneth Karst has 
deemed" 'Heads, we win; tails, you lose.' " 11 Karst notes that "when 
majoritarian politics produces an affirmative action program"12 like 
the lay-off scheme in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 13 or the 
set-aside plan in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 14 those challeng-
ing the constitutionality of such plans have argued with increasing ef-
fectiveness that the plans abandon the "principle of 'individual merit' 
in favor of a group remedy."15 But when blacks show disparate im-
pact to support charges that a policy is discriminatory despite its facial 
neutrality, the Court expresses a "slippery-slope" type fear that relief 
would be unlimited, much as it did in Washington v. Davis. 16 Seem-
ingly traumatized by this fear, the Court rejects impressive evidence of 
7. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1982). 
8. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372 (1989). 
9. 109 S. Ct. at 2373; see also Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989) 
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not provide an independent federal damage remedy for 
racial discrimination by local government entities); Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 
2261 (1989) (holding that a discrimination claim against a seniority system begins to run at the 
tin!,e of its adoption even though its discriminatory effect may not be noticeable at that time); 
Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (holding that firefighters who failed to intervene in 
earlier employment discrimination case are not precluded from challenging employment deci· 
sions taken pursuant to the consent decree issued in the earlier case); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (suggesting more stringent standards of proof in employment 
discrimination cases and appearing to reject the "disparate impact" analysis adopted in the 
landmark decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401U.S.424 (1971)); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (Court, using strict scrutiny test, invalidated a municipal set· 
aside plan that required prime contractors to subcontract to minority subcontractors at least 
30% of the dollar amount of each city contract awarded). 
10. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
11. K. KARsr, BELONGING TO AMERICA 158 (1989). 
12. Id. 
13. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (layoff scheme provided that teachers with most seniority would be 
retained but that minority members would never constitute a higher percentage of those laid off 
than the percentage of minority personnel employed when the layoffs occurred). 
14. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). The set-aside plan is briefly described supra, at note 9. 
15. K. KARsr, supra note 11, at 158. 
16. Justice White's opinion reflects the "slippery slope" argument against using showings of 
disparate impact to establish that a statute is discriminatory: 
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discriminatory motive, while suggesting that group harms should be 
remedied by majoritarian politics.11 
In the past, one of the best defenses against racial meanness was a 
black person like Joe Small. Reading The Port Chicago Mutiny, I 
wondered: In a society where black people willing to confront racial 
discrimination in a defiant way are treated as dangerous and subver-
sive, what combination of circumstances produces an individual with 
Joe Small's pride and self-assurance? In the military service and in 
civilian life, Small always stood up for his rights and, often enough, 
paid a price for his refusal to buckle under. And yet, he harbored no 
bitterness, proudly telling Robert Allen that his son was enlisting in 
the Navy. Whatever the source of Small's strengths, one wonders 
whether they would be sufficient were he growing up in an inner-city 
area today. 
For those of us active in the civil rights movement, it is difficult to 
concede that the segregation era - with all its hardships - was less 
harsh than life for poor and working class blacks in this post-Brown 
"equal opportunity" period. Unlike the Supreme Court reviewing the 
statistics in the McC/eskey v. Kemp death penalty case,18 we cannot 
ignore the steadily worsening statistics of black poverty, unemploy-
ment, broken homes, drug abuse, and violent crime. Thus, while Rob-
ert Allen has provided us with a quite readable report of a fifty-year-
old, racial "mutiny" that never was, both social indicators and com-
mon sense enable a prediction that, without major reforms, future ra-
cial rebellions will not be just fabrications manifesting the meanness of 
racist whites. Rather, they will be the predictable consequences of 
that meanness, and will not likely be deterred because the charges of 
mutiny are accurate. 
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent com-
pellingjustification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be 
far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range 
of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burden-
some to the poor and to the average black than to the more aflluent white." 
426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
17. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
McCleskey's arguments [that statistical evidence strongly indicates that in Georgia, blacks 
convicted of killing whites are far more likely to receive the death penalty than either blacks 
or whites convicted of killing blacks] are best presented to the legislative bodies ..•. Legisla-
tures ••• are better qualified to weigh and "evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms 
of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the 
courts." 
481 U.S. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)). 
18. See supra note 17. 
